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Abstract 
Background 
Some realists have criticised randomised controlled trials for their inability to explain 
the causal relations that they identify; to take into account the influence of the social 
context of the interventions they evaluate; and to account for individual difference. 
However, among realists, there is controversy over whether it is possible to improve 
trials by making them realist, or whether realism and the philosophical assumptions 
underlying trials are incompatible. This paper contributes to the debate in Trials on 
this issue. The debate thus far has concentrated on the possibility of combining trial 
methodology with that of realist evaluation. 
 
Main Body 
We concur with the contention that it is not feasible to combine randomised 
controlled trial design with the realist evaluation approach. However, we argue that a 
different variant of realism, critical realism, provides a more appropriate theoretical 
grounding for realist trials. 
 
In contrast to realist evaluation, which regards social mechanisms as an amalgam of 
social resources and people’s reasoning, critical realism insists on their distinction. It 
does so on the basis of its assertion of the need to distinguish between social 
structures (in which resources lie) and human agency (which is at least partly guided 
by reasoning). From this perspective, conceiving of social mechanisms as external to 
participants (and therefore amenable to examination by trials) can be seen as a valid 
methodological strategy. 
 
While accepting realist evaluation’s insistence that causality in open systems 
involves a configuration of multiple generative mechanisms, we adopt the critical 
realist interpretation of the experimental method, which sees it as creating artificial 
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closure in order to identify the effects of specific causal mechanisms. If randomised 
controlled trials can be regarded as epidemiological proxies that substitute 
probabilistic controls over extraneous factors for closed experiments, their 
examination of the powers of discrete mechanisms through observation of the 
variation of outcomes is appropriate. 
 
Conclusion 
We conclude that, while there are still issues to be resolved, critical realist 
randomised controlled trials are possible and have the potential to overcome some of 
the difficulties faced by traditional trial designs in accounting for the influence of 
social context and individual interpretation. 
 
Key words 
RCT, depth realism, critical realism, realist evaluation, elision, causality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
This paper is a further contribution to the debate in Trials [1, 2] about the possibility 
of conducting ‘genuinely realist’ [2] randomised controlled trials (RCTs). However, 
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before engaging in the debate, we should clarify what we mean when we talk about 
realism, and explain why we believe it can make a worthwhile contribution to 
evaluation science. 
 
Realism, in its broadest sense, is the belief that there is an external reality that exists 
independently of human perception. That, of course, begs the question of what that 
reality consists of, and there have been many different answers to this question, 
giving rise to numerous schools of realism. As a result, talk of a single ‘genuine’ 
realism is not very helpful. Indeed, to the extent that RCTs are underpinned by Karl 
Popper’s post-positivist philosophy, they are already genuinely realist. Popper [3] 
accepted ‘realism as the only sensible hypothesis … [W]hat we attempt in science is 
to describe and (so far as possible) explain reality’ (pp. 40-42).  
 
For Popper, the job of science was to pose hypotheses about causal relations and 
then test them empirically to see whether or not relations of regular succession could 
be identified between the hypothesised cause and hypothesised effect. So, Popper’s 
reality consisted of observable things and events. This variant of realism can be 
described as ‘empirical realism’ or ‘actualism’ ([4], p. 57). In contrast, the realism that 
is being referred to here is ‘depth realism’ ([5], p. 42). The term reflects Roy 
Bhaskar’s argument that there is another level of reality underlying events, consisting 
of the mechanisms whose powers cause those events to occur ([4], p. 56). Bhaskar 
uses the term ‘mechanism’ to describe causal laws to underline acceptance that their 
powers may be latent and their effects contingent ([4], p. 49). 
 
Among the benefits of such an approach, he argues, is that it opens up the possibility 
of going beyond identification to explanation, thereby enabling a more nuanced 
understanding of why relationships of succession between one event and another 
are rarely constant. In open systems, which typically have a number of mechanisms 
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operating simultaneously, what actually happens will depend on their combination. 
Thus, to take a simple binary example, whether or not an object floats does not only 
depend upon its mass, but also upon the density of the fluid it is in. In other words, its 
position will be dependent on the particular combination of the mechanisms of gravity 
and buoyancy that pertains.  
 
But why should it matter that RCTs are founded upon a successionist view of 
causality? What is so debilitating about basing science on an actualist ontology? 
Some argue that all this philosophical conjecturing is beside the point; what matters 
is that RCTs (and the procedures and policies that they identify as effective) work. 
From such a perspective, theoretical ruminations such as this are decidedly unhelpful 
[6]. In a similar vein, Scriven [7] argues that the realist aspiration to explain causal 
relations involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the aim of evaluation, which 
should be purely about identifying them. 
 
Yet while the RCT may be lauded as the least worst way to gain accurate and 
unbiased knowledge about the effectiveness of interventions [8] it displays generally 
accepted weaknesses in its ability, for example, to generalise to different contexts, to 
be sensitive to individual characteristics, and to be able to discern the specific effects 
of components within complex interventions [9-12]. Strategies have been developed 
to deal with these issues, the most notable being the British Medical Research 
Council’s Framework for the Development and Evaluation of Complex Healthcare 
Interventions [13]. The MRC Framework seeks to supplement the standard RCT with 
procedures that take complexity and context into account. Thus, its pre-clinical and 
modelling phases may incorporate qualitative testing to enable investigators to 
describe the component parts of the intervention to ascertain which are considered 
essential and which can be adapted to fit with the local context. It also recommends 
post-trial evaluation to uncover how context influences outcomes in order to aid 
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everyday clinical implementation.  
Depth realists have pointed to the incompatibility of these adjustments with the basic 
philosophical assumptions on which trials are based [14, 15]. RCTs are founded on a 
conception of causality as the regular succession of events in the form of stimulus 
and response. The addition of human interpretation and choice that is implied in the 
adoption of qualitative methods, along with an acceptance of the role of context in 
explanation, undermines that conception [16]. Conversely, if the validity and reliability 
of RCTs is accepted, then individual perspectives and contextual influences are 
rendered superfluous.  
From a depth realist perspective, the MRC Framework might be seen as an instance 
of what Kuhn [17] describes as the ad hoc adjustments made to a paradigm at the 
point when its inability to cope with anomalies between its theoretical foundations 
and the problems it faces is becoming increasingly evident [16].  
Conversely, from a post-positivist perspective, developments like the Framework 
might be regarded as facilitating a sustainable adjustment to the methods used to 
evaluate complex interventions, enabling them to combine attention to the causative 
characteristics of both the interventions themselves and the contexts within which 
they occur.  In other words, to return to the pragmatic assertion of the irrelevance of 
theory, if the Framework works, that is what matters, not its nonconformity to some 
obscure theoretical strictures. 
The depth realist response to such pragmatic objections is that confusion in theory 
leads to confusion in practice. If there is ambiguity about the relationship between 
qualitative and quantitative data and/or between intervention and context, then it 
becomes difficult for researchers to construct coherent explanations [16].  
However, while depth realists may be united in their dissatisfaction with RCTs’ 
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concentration on the succession of events at a cost to examining the causes of those 
successions, especially when RCTs are concerned with the evaluation of 
interventions designed to change people’s behaviour, they are not agreed on the 
solution to the problem. Some regard trials as incompatible with depth realism [18]; 
while others argue that it is possible to conduct trials using realist assumptions [19]. 
The current debate in the pages of Trials is located within this controversy. 
Introduction 
Our central contention in this paper is that realist RCTs designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of behaviour-changing interventions are possible, but only if they are 
founded upon a different type of realist philosophy to that currently adopted by both 
Jamal et al. [1] in their commendation of realist RCTs and Van Belle et al. [2] in their 
critique of them. The common ground they share is the version of realism that is 
found in the philosophical underpinnings of Pawson and Tilley’s [20] realist 
evaluation. The problem for Jamal et al., as Van Belle et al. point out, is that the 
assumptions embedded in realist RCTs about the nature of causal mechanisms and 
the processes of causality are inimical to those of realist evaluation.   
 
While Pawson and Tilley accept Bhaskar’s depth realism, they reject his 
extrapolation of its principles to the examination of the social world in the form of 
critical realism [15].  Critical realism, as formulated by Bhaskar [21] and developed by 
Archer [22] and others, regards structured social relations as possessing causal 
powers similar to natural causal powers, in that they are experienced by people as 
external forces that enable or constrain how they act. The effects of these structural 
mechanisms can be seen in empirically observable patterns, such as the association 
of social class with educational attainment. However, unlike natural mechanisms, 
with their wider range of influence, social mechanisms act specifically on human 
beings. This is significant because human beings have causal powers of their own. 
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They have the power to choose how to act on the basis of their interpretations of 
what is the best course for them to take. For example, it is perfectly possible (though 
less likely and more difficult) for a working class person to attain a higher degree. So, 
for critical realists, the human sciences have to take account of two distinct sources 
of causation - social structures and human agents. 
 
 In contrast, realist evaluation rejects the claim that social structures are separate, 
objective entities, seeing social mechanisms as the latent powers and capacities of 
individuals [2]. It is this interpretation of social mechanisms as having internal, 
reflexive components that leads realist evaluators to regard attempts to understand 
human behaviour through the identification of successions of events as 
inappropriate.  
 
In this paper, accepting the incompatibility of RCTs with realist evaluation, we will 
contend that the adoption of a critical realist approach, as defined by Bhaskar [21] 
and Archer [22], reopens the space for realist RCTs. To support our argument, we 
will present the critical realist view of causal mechanisms as objective influences on 
human behaviour as an alternative to realist evaluation’s conception of mechanisms 
as combinations of resources and reasons. We will also examine how critical realist 
interpretations of experimental closure distinguish it from realist evaluation’s position 
on the focus of scientific research. 
 
The critique of realist RCTs 
In their commentary, Van Belle et al. [2] raise at least four major objections to Jamal 
et al.’s [1] overview of realist RCTs, which we will address in turn. Their first is that 
Jamal et al.’s conception of interventions largely ignores the role of human volition in 
behavioural change.  
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Secondly, they contend that Jamal et al. regard mechanisms as external factors 
introduced into a social context, rather than being ‘a function of the interaction 
between intervention resources and responses of participants’ (p. 3).  
 
Van Belle et al.’s third argument is that Jamal et al.’s segmentation of mechanisms 
into discrete, statistically amenable entities is inimical to the configurational approach 
to causation of what they term ‘scientific’ realism, a descriptor which we interpret as 
analogous to ‘depth’ realism. 
 
Their fourth objection concerns RCTs’ requirement for randomisation and control, 
which means they have limited powers to deal with dynamic and complex causation. 
 
Neglect of volition? 
Van Belle et al. [2] take issue with Jamal et al.’s [1] description of realist analysis as 
testing ‘how the intervention theory of change interacts with context’, arguing that it is 
‘not the “intervention theory of change” that interacts with context. Rather, scientific 
realism holds that interventions take place in specific contexts and address actors, 
who decide (or not) to change their behaviour, choices or decisions in response to 
the resources and opportunities offered by the intervention’ (p. 2). The relationship 
between the three main components highlighted by Van Belle et al. might be best 
illustrated by an example. In a realist evaluation of the Liverpool Care Pathway for 
the Dying Patient [23], we noticed that the effectiveness of the pathway (intervention) 
was undermined by the withdrawal of educational resources to train staff in its use 
(context), but different actors responded to this challenge in different ways (agency), 
with nurses tending to continue promoting the pathway through informal education, 
while physicians were less committed to sustaining it. 
Van Belle et al.’s charge is that Jamal et al.’s description of the engine of behavioural 
change confines itself to the ‘external’ causal forces contained in the intervention and 
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its social context, ignoring the capacity of people to choose how to respond to those 
external forces. In other words, it is concentrating on social structures at the cost of 
human agency.  
 
To the extent that Jamal et al. make no mention of human agency in their description 
of contexts or mechanisms, there is some merit to this charge. However, elsewhere 
they include qualitative process evaluation in their framework to capture ‘a sense of 
research participants’ own meanings, their sense of agency and how this inter-
relates with the social structure of intervention context’ ([1], p. 6). While we would 
take issue with the confinement of Jamal et al.’s analysis to the connection between 
agency and context, and argue that it should be extended to include the crucial 
relationship between people and interventions , it is clear that their model does 
address human agency. However, by analytically distinguishing agency from social 
structure, it does so in a manner that Van Belle et al. do not perceive as legitimately 
realist. 
 
Resources and responses 
Van Belle et al. argue that Jamal et al.’s description of mechanisms involves a 
categorical error in that it ‘wrongly implies that mechanisms can be introduced into a 
situation and are thus external; scientific realism holds that mechanisms are not 
external factors but latent powers and capabilities, which are a function of the 
interactions between intervention resources and responses of participants’ ([2], p. 3).  
 
We have to take issue with Van Belle et al.’s claim that all versions of ‘scientific’ 
realism hold that mechanisms are a function of the interaction of resources and 
responses, and point to critical realism’s contrary stance, based on its separation of 
social structures and human agency ([21], p. 79), that the mechanisms involved in 
resources and responses are distinct ([22], p. 89).  
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Social structures  
For critical realists, social structures possess generative mechanisms that influence 
the behaviour of humans, exerting ‘an objective influence which conditions action 
patterns and supplies agents with strategic directional guidance’ ([22], p. 196). They 
explain the objective influence of social mechanisms by recourse to a relational 
conception of society which holds that it is characterised by a matrix of relatively 
enduring social relations between individuals and groups (for example, between men 
and women or employers and employees), and that an individual’s position in this 
matrix will configure their opportunities or constraints, and the resources or 
deprivations that they experience. It will also impose cultural or legal expectations for 
an individual or group to engage in the practices associated with their social 
position(s).  
 
Human agency 
Social mechanisms do not act upon inanimate objects, but on human beings with the 
powers of reflexivity, reason and interpretation. The significance of this is that, when 
considering the behaviour of people, the additional component of conscious intent 
needs to be added to causal explanations. In many circumstances, people have the 
capacity to choose how they respond to external stimuli. This means, among other 
things, that their responses to their positions in structured social relations will not be 
determined by those positions, but will result from their reflection on the options that 
they have. More specifically, it means that their responses to changes in their 
position resulting from the introduction of complex interventions will be a 
consequence of the choices they make. 
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In summary, critical realism’s ‘analytical dualism’ ([22], p. 15), whereby it 
distinguishes social structures from human agency, entails a categorical distinction 
between social resources and individual reasons.  
 
Conflations of structure and agency 
In her critique of approaches to the relationship between structure and agency that 
seek to identify a unitary explanation for human behaviour, Margaret Archer [22] 
identifies three types of conflation. ‘Downwards conflation’ is entailed in collectivist 
theories that place the primary causal onus on social structures and strip human 
choice and agency of power. ‘Upwards conflation’ can be found in social theories that 
insist that reality consists of nothing but individuals and their activities, giving social 
structures a fictional status. Critical realists reject both of these conflations on the 
grounds that, because both social structures and human agents possess their own 
unique generative mechanisms, one cannot be reduced to the other. 
 
Traditional RCT methodology is implicitly predicated upon a downwards conflation of 
causal explanation in that, by regarding the intervention as the explanatory variable, 
it privileges structural influence over individual choice. Conversely, given RCTs’ 
reliance on statistical averages to identify correlations, the method is simply not 
designed to take individual volition into account. However, Jamal et al.’s proposal for 
the inclusion of qualitative empirical strategies to take account of the role of agency 
in the production of outcomes means that the same charge cannot be laid at the door 
of their conception of realist RCTs. 
 
The third form of conflation, ‘central conflation’, differs from the first two in that it 
rejects the reduction of either structure or agency in favour of their mutual unification, 
arguing that they are inseparable and can only be conceptualised in relation to each 
other in a ‘duality of structure’ [24].  ‘Rather than seeing action and structure as 
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counter-acting elements of a dualism, we should regard them as the complementary 
terms of a duality’ ([25], p. 58). It is not a matter of trying to explain human behaviour 
through the influence of external factors (as the traditional RCT does), or of 
explaining behaviour entirely in terms of individual volition (as much qualitative 
analysis does), but of appreciating ‘how action is structured in everyday contexts and 
how the structured features of action are, by the very performance of an action, 
thereby reproduced’. ([25], p. 56) 
 
Critical realists reject the central elision of structure and agency on both ontological 
and methodological grounds. At an ontological level, Bhaskar [21] emphasises ‘the 
importance of distinguishing, in the most categorical way, between human action and 
the social structure’: 
 
The properties possessed by social forms may be very different from those 
possessed by the individuals upon whose activity they depend. I want to 
distinguish sharply then between the genesis of human actions, lying in the 
reasons, intentions and plans of human beings, on the one hand; and the 
structures governing the reproduction and transformation of social activities, 
on the other (p. 79). 
 
Archer [22] makes the complementary argument that the reason for distinguishing 
between human action and social structure is ‘not simply because ontologically they 
are indeed different entities with different properties and powers, but because 
methodologically it is necessary to make the distinction between them in order to 
examine their interplay and thus be able to explain why things are “so and not 
otherwise” in society’ (p. 64). 
 
Realist evaluation’s elision 
14 
 
While Van Belle et al. may have overstated their case when they argued that 
‘scientific realism holds that mechanisms are … a function of the interactions 
between intervention resources and responses of participants’, their earlier statement 
that ‘wide agreement exists that “response to resources” is the defining feature of 
mechanisms in the work of Pawson and Tilley’ ([2], p. 2) can be accepted without 
contention. Their critique of Jamal et al.’s separation of social resources from 
people’s responses is founded on the particular grounds of Pawson and Tilley’s 
interpretation of realism. 
 
Pawson and Tilley [20]  derive their conception of programme mechanisms as 
involving ‘an interplay between social resources and participants’ reasoning’ (p. 75) 
from their understanding of the composition of social mechanisms, which they define 
as being about ‘people’s choices and the capacities they derive from group 
membership’ (p. 66). Pawson and Tilley’s definition of social mechanisms in general 
and programme mechanisms in particular as consisting of a combination of structure 
(‘the capacities derived from group membership’ / ‘social resources’) and agency 
(‘people’s choices’ / ‘participants’ reasoning’) stands in stark contrast to the critical 
realist insistence that agency and structure are different entities with different 
properties and powers [26].  
 
Ironically, despite their stated adoption of the assumptions underlying realist 
evaluation, Jamal et al.’s distinction between agency and social structure is more 
compatible with the assumptions of critical realism. Their interpretation of social 
mechanisms as objective entities that are analytically distinguishable from human 
agency has the benefit of enabling evaluators to examine structure and agency’s 
‘interplay and thus be able to explain why things are “so and not otherwise”’ ([22], p. 
64).   
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It has to be conceded that Jamal et al. do not fully articulate the relationships 
between the basic components addressed by realist RCTs. A clearer definition of 
those relationships is therefore required. To that end, we commend the model that 
conceives of observed outcomes as the result of the interaction of contextual 
mechanisms, programme mechanisms and human agency [26].  
 
Configuration or correlation? 
Van Belle et al. argue that, in line with notions of causation traditionally associated 
with RCTs, Jamal et al. adopt a successionist mode of explanation which involves 
the correlation of variables, whereby one (the dependent variable) succeeds the 
other (the explanatory variable). As Van Belle et al. point out, realism rejects 
successionist modes of causal explanation. It does so on the grounds that they 
confuse causes with effects. In contrast, depth realists categorically distinguish 
empirical regularities from the mechanisms that generate them [4]. However, this 
position does not warrant Van Belle et al.’s rejection of the concept of ‘variables’, at 
least as it pertains to outcome patterns. Because these patterns can be varied by the 
introduction of an intervention, and because they are distinct from the mechanisms 
that generate them, Jamal et al.’s focus on their measurement does not necessarily 
entail the adoption of an approach ‘that reduces mechanisms … to mere variables’ 
(p. 4), though their use of descriptors such as ‘mediating variables’ for mechanisms 
seems to reflect a vestige of successionist assumptions.  
 
While Van Belle et al. accept that Jamal et al.’s model involves multiple mechanisms, 
they argue that the latters’ discrete treatment of each hypothesised mechanism fails 
to take account of the depth realist tenet that outcomes are the result of causal 
configurations. This means that realism’s ‘explanation relies on showing the 
relationship between context and mechanism’, rather than treating them as separate 
strands (p. 4). 
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Van Belle et al.’s assertion that outcomes result from causal configurations is a 
commonly accepted tenet of depth realism, so far as it pertains to open systems. 
However, while causation in open systems is complex, this does not mean that 
individual mechanisms are bereft of distinctive causal powers. Here, we concur with 
Van Belle et al.’s assertion that generative mechanisms are not variables in that, 
while variation of the configuration of mechanisms will lead to variable outcomes, this 
does not imply a variation in the intrinsic qualities of the constituent mechanisms. 
Mechanisms’ possession of specific causal properties means that, assuming they 
can be isolated from other mechanisms, their powers can, in principle, be measured. 
From a critical realist perspective, this is the focus of experimental science, and the 
reason why it has been so successful [4]. 
 
As has been previously been pointed out by the defenders of realist RCTs [27] in 
response to the accusation that RCT design is inherently positivist [28], methods 
don’t make assumptions, researchers (and we might add research methodologists) 
do. If we consider Bhaskar’s seminal critical realist examination of the experimental 
method in natural science [4], we can see that the purpose of experimental closure is 
to prevent as many mechanisms as possible, apart from the one whose causal 
powers are the object of interest, from exerting a differential influence, so that any 
regularities observed can be interpreted as being caused by the mechanism of 
interest. It is through this simplification of context that experimental science is able to 
identify particular causal powers. Thus, experimentation entails creating an artificially 
controlled environment with the aim testing hypotheses about specific causal 
mechanisms. In other words, it is concerned with neutralising configurations as far as 
possible, rather than treating them as the objects of investigation per se.  
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While Bhaskar perceives the social world as necessarily open and therefore not 
amenable to experimental closure [21], it has been argued that RCTs can be 
regarded as analogous to natural science experiments in that randomisation, blinding 
and recruitment of sufficient numbers to ensure statistical power involves the use of 
probability theory to approximate the closed system of the experiment [16]. To the 
extent that RCTs can be regarded as epidemiological proxies that substitute 
probabilistic controls over extraneous factors for experimental closure [32], the 
strategy of developing hypotheses about specific mechanisms and using statistical 
methods to test them would seem to be a viable course to take. 
 
This equation of RCTs with experiments is not entirely straightforward in that, while 
RCTs can control for context, their focus tends to remain on the intervention, rather 
than specific mechanisms within the intervention. When addressing complex 
interventions, which frequently consist of a number of components, this lack of 
specific focus can compromise explanatory power [29]. However, experimental 
designs have been developed to identify causal mechanisms within the ‘black box’ of 
interventions [30], including the causal mediation analysis [31] favoured by Jamal et 
al., though the degree to which they are consonant with realist tenets is yet to be fully 
established. 
 
Even if we allow that RCTs have the methodological capacity to impose conditions 
analogous to those of the closed experiment, they contain limitations that indicate the 
need for additional evaluative strategies. First, trials cannot take into account the 
causal effects of the configuration of mechanisms that come into play once 
experimental conditions are relaxed. Second, the outcomes they measure are not 
simply caused by the social mechanisms they are examining, but by the interplay 
between those mechanisms and the interpretive and causal powers of human agents 
[16]. 
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Simplicity and complexity 
Noting that RCTs’ requirement for randomisation and control means that they can 
only test a few simple context-mechanism-outcome configurations, Van Belle et al. 
conclude that ‘at best, then, the RCT may help us in assessing the relative 
contribution of mechanisms to outcome patterns if the causal configuration is 
uniform’ (pp. 4-5). Notwithstanding Bonell et al.’s [32] response to the contrary, we 
concur with Van Belle et al., but interpret this circumscribed contribution to evaluation 
as extremely useful. It is through such simplification that the efficacy of an 
intervention (the extent to which it ‘produces a beneficial result under ideal 
circumstances’ [33] can be established. However, precisely because of their closure 
and control, trials are far less able to demonstrate effectiveness (‘the extent to which 
a specific intervention, when used under ordinary circumstances, does what it is 
intended to do’ [33].  
 
While the demonstration of efficacy is a necessary component of evaluation, it is not 
a sufficient one, in that it does not take account of the effect of open systems where 
other mechanisms are operating concurrently [14]. Nor, with their function of 
describing rather than explaining ‘demi-regularities’ [34], are RCTs able to take 
account of human reasoning [16]. We wish to argue that these weaknesses in the 
experimental approach indicate the need for three distinctive methodological 
strategies, ‘one designed to enumerate outcome patterns; one designed to identify 
the mechanisms embedded in an intervention and its social context; and one 
designed to uncover the experiences, interpretations and responses of the actors 
involved’ ([35], p. 78). 
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RCTs can constitute one of these three strategies, in that they can be used to test 
efficacy by enumerating outcome patterns in tightly controlled environments which 
minimise (or cancel out) the effects of contextual mechanisms on outcomes [16,14].  
 
The second strategy involves the development and testing of realist hypotheses 
about the resources and restrictions embedded in the intervention and its contexts, 
and their relationships. This strategy can be used to build middle-range theories 
about processes of causation; model the intervention; refine theories to provide 
explanations concerning what works for whom in what circumstances; and inform 
those introducing efficacious interventions into open contexts of contextual 
mechanisms that may affect their sustained effectiveness [26]. 
 
The third strategy involves qualitative investigation designed to uncover how the 
human agents affected by the intervention respond to the resources and restrictions 
it presents.  We contend that this qualitative stage should not confine itself to 
examination of the reasoning behind agents’ responses for the purpose of optimising 
the motivational appeal of the intervention. In addition to this instrumental function, it 
should also attempt to illuminate people’s experiences of the intervention for the 
purpose of critically establishing its beneficial or detrimental effects upon the lives of 
those affected by it [26]. 
 
Conclusion 
While our main aim has been to open up the possibility of realist RCTs as a useful 
approach to the evaluation of complex interventions, we do not wish push our 
arguments too far. There are number of reasons for caution. First, as Van Belle et al. 
point out, there is a dearth of practical examples of realist RCTs; even the exemplar 
presented by Jamal et al. is incomplete. There is a lot of practical and theoretical 
work yet to be done before a fully-fledged model of realist RCTs is developed. Not 
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least, we suspect that such a model will need to be considerably lighter of touch than 
that currently proposed by Jamal et al. if it is not to be prohibitively burdensome. This 
is a significant issue because if realist trials are to have an impact on evaluation 
science, they are going to have to demonstrate that they are useable as well as 
useful. 
 
We also do not think that the debate about the relative merits of realist RCTs versus 
realist evaluations nested in RCTs (or perhaps better, RCTs nested in critical realist 
evaluations) is settled yet. In our own empirical work relating to palliative care, we 
have been adopting the three parallel strategies outlined above [36-39].  
 
Finally, given that the experimental approach to social systems that RCTs entail is 
not warranted by Bhaskarian realism [8], which regards those systems as irreducibly 
open, our mapping of RCTs onto critical realism is not straightforward. Further 
conversation about this extension of naturalistic science into the social world is 
required. 
 
Notwithstanding these notes of caution, our purpose in this paper has been to 
establish the possibility and indeed desirability of realist RCTs. In terms of possibility, 
we hope that our discussion about the articulation of the assumptions embedded in 
realist RCTs with the tenets of critical realism has demonstrated that trials can be 
grounded in a cogent and consonant realist philosophy of science.  
 
In terms of desirability, we have identified critical realist RCTs’ potential to overcome 
the limitations of traditional trial designs in accounting for the influence of social 
context and individual interpretation on the outcomes of complex interventions. What 
critical realism promises is a framework to allow researchers to combine output, 
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process and experiential data in a complementary fashion that gives due regard to 
each piece of the explanatory jigsaw. 
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